ABSTRACT
In many countries nowadays unemployment is considered to be one of the most severe economic problems. The governments have to make a choíce, among other things, to rely on the private sector to create employment or to create employment in the public sector. The second possibility is directly successful but has to be finenced by money creation or taxation. Since money creation has ita limits (Barro, 19~4) , the government's problem focusaes on the question whether or not the creation of extra public employment with high taxation is a good employment policy. For a given level of net wages in the private sector high taxatíon implies less investment possibilities for the fírms and that might imply lesa employment in the private sector and less future tax revenues. (Stiglitz, 1986) or by trade union behaviour (Van der Ploeg, 1987) . The maximisation of profit leads to the well-known condition that the marginal productivity of labour equals the real wage, which implies that labour is a linear function of the capital stock:
Substitution of (1) and then (3) into (2) givea profit as a linear function of the capital stock:
where the rentability of the capital stock S is given by (4)
Investment I accounts for the growth of the capital stock
Without affecting the basic results of the paper it is assumed that there is no depreciation. Investment can only be financed by retained earnings. The firm has to decide on the division of after-tax profit R-TX, where TX denotes total taxation, over dividend D end investment:
5 The firm's objective is to maximise the total stream of dividends over a plenning period [O,T] T(
and the firm's instrument is the investment rate i, which is defined as
Since the labour input L doea not show up dynamically in the optimisation problem, it is correct to first maximise profit with respect to L and then Feichtinger and Hartl, 1986) .
It is assumed that the government can use tax income TX to create public employment for the same wage w as in the private sector. Under the assumption of Ricardian debt neutrality it does not make any difference, whether the government is given the opportunity to borrow money or not. The government's objective is to maximise total employment over a planning
and the government's instrument is the corporate tax rate T, which is defined as
where ti and T2 are the minimal and the maximal tax rate, respectively. It seems reasonable to assume that there are always some taxes and that profits are never taxed away completely. Substitution of (~), (9), (11) and then (4) into (8) leeds to the following behavioural model for the firm: (5) into ( 3) leads to L-l~W K and substitution of this result. (11) and then (4) into ( 10) leads to the following behavioural model for the government:
The strategic dynamic i nteraction between the government and the firm is described by the differentiel game (12)- (14). This differential game is in structure very similar to the Lancaster (19~3) game of capitalism, which was further investigated by Hoel (1978) , Pohjola (1983) end Ba~ar, Haurie and Ricci (1985) . The government plays the role of the workers and the firm plays the role of the capitalists. In the next section several relevant equilibria for the differentiel game (12)- (14) will be derived.
Strategic equilibria
In Lhis section game equilibria for the differentisl game ( For reasons of exposition the open-loop Nash solution will be presented first. Finally, the efficient or Pareto optimal equilibria will be derived.
In this section it will be assumed that the maximal corporate tax rate T2 is at least Z.
-
The open-loop Nash solution for the differential game (12)- (14) is given by
where tN -T -1 P(1-T2). 
T(t) -zl. if w-P~(t)i(t) ( 0 T(t) -T2, if w-p~(t)i(t) ) 0
and that the costate p0 is gíven by the adjoint system p0(t) L -P{(l~a.T(t))w . p0(t)(1-T(t))i(c)} p0(T)~0.
(17) (18) The Hamiltonian function for the maximisation problem of the firm is given
It follows that the firm's rational reaction to the strategy of the government is given by
and that the costate pP is given by the adjoint syatem
In the open-loop Nash solution there is a period (tN,T] where i(t) -0 end thus T(t) -t2. The point in time tN can be found from the adjoint system for the costate pF. Because it is assumed that t2 ) 2, so that T2 ) 1-2~, the value of the costate p0 at tN is larger than W. F~rthermore, both costates pF and p0 are monotonically decreasing. It follows that before the point in time tN 1(t) -1 and t(t) -tl. Q.E.D. (14) with the government as leader and the firm as follower is given by
where ti -T -2~.
Proof
The proof resembles Pohjola's (1983) The firm is follower. The firm's rational reaction to the atrategy of the government is already derived in the proof of proposition 1.
The Hamiltonian Function for the maximisation problem of the government is now given by
It follows that the government's optímal strategy is given by
where
and that the costate q0 is given by the adjoint system 
qG(t~h) -J~7G(t) dt~J{PQ(t)K(t) t(1-PF(t))qQ(t))b(t-t) dt,
t-h t-h with h) 0, can be found by partiel integration. The result is
qG(tah) --pG,(t)K(t)~(Z8)
It follows that g(t) -(W -pG(t))K(t) for t) t.
If tl ) 1-2a, then g(t) ( 0 and t(t)~tl for t) t, and the switch-point for this case can be Found from the adjoint aystem for the coatate pF.
If tl C 1-Zá, then g(t) -0 for t) t, and the awitch-point for thia case as 
can be found from the adjoint systems for the costates pG and pF with p~(t) -
Q.E.D. w
In proposition 2ii the government's strategy after ti is not unique. Due to the error in the derivation this non-uniqueneas of the equilibrium was not found by Pohjola (1983) . The government can choose, for example, an average tax rate 1-2á or the government can choose to continue for a while with the minimal tax rate T1 and then to switch to the maximal tax rate 22 at S 2oc(1-tl)-1 t2 -T -~(t2-T1) . The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations are given by
VBt(t,K) t max {{(láar-C)w t V~(t,K)(1-T)i}SK} z 0 i (31) VFt(t,K) t max {{(1-i)(1-i)~V~(t,K)(1-i)i}~K}
i where VG and VF are the value functíons for the government and the Firm, respectively.
Because the rational reaction of the firm i does not depend on the action T of the government, the feedback Stackelberg solution with the government as leader and the firm as follower coincides with the feedback Nash solution. 
It is easy to check, with value funtions V~(t,K)~pQ(t)K and VF(t,K) -pF(t)K and

-~)w, T(t)~T1, i(t) -1, for t E[O,ti) T(t) -t2, i(tr z 1, for t E ( ti,t2) z(t)~T2, i(t) -0, for t E ( t2,T],
where tP -Tand 2 p{~(1~~fT2)wF(1-a)(1-TZ)} P P 1~(loc~~1)w tl -t2 -P(1-i2)ln{~(la~;s2)wi(1-a)(1-T2)}
ii) if~~(1-a)w, t(t) -T1, i(t) -1, for t E[O,t3) T(t) a T1, i(t) -0, for t E(t3,T],
where t3~T -p{~(láa.Tl)w~(1-7~)(1-tl)} (33)
111) if a-(1-a)w, i(t) -T1, i(t)~1, for t E[O,t4) t(t) E[T1,T2], 1(t) -0, for t E(t4,T],
where t4 -T -~.
Proof
The efficient or Pareto optimal solutions result from the application of Pontryagin's maximum principle to the HemilLOnian functions
HP(K,T,i,p,t) z{~(1~~tT)w t(1-a)(1-T)(1-i) t p(1-T)i}SK (36)
wi th 0 C a( 1.
It follows that the optimal cooperative atrategy i a given by
T(t) -T1, í f W C max(p(t),1-~)
t(t) -Tz, if w) max(p(t),1-a)
and that the costate p ia given by the adjoint system P(t) --P{J~(láa~t(t))W t (1-a)(1-T(t))(1-i(t)) p(t)(1-T(t))i(t)}
1~1 I i tt (37)
Again there is a point in time where the firm switches from investment to dividend. The value of the corporate tax rate t after that point in time depends only on the value of A, since p(t) C 1-a. The switch-points for the different values of a can then be found from the adjoint system for the costate p. If W G 1-a, then the value of the corporate tax rate t before that switch-point is T1. If w) 1-~, then the government switches from the minimal tax rate T1 to the maximal tax rate t2 at the point in time where the costate p is equsl to W. Q.E.D.
In the next sections these results will be used for an analysis of the model pre:;ented in scctíon 2. [ Table 1] Example 2 Suppose w: 2, K(0)~1, T-8, t1~0.25, T2 a 0.75 and ac -0.75.
The "best" eoployment policy
[ Table 2 ]
It is intereating to note that private employment as a percentage of total employment increasea for the more efficíent outcomes. The reeaon is that the more efficient outcomes have a longer period of investment.
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The by now well-known drawback of the open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium is that the leader's strategy is time-inconsiatent. It will be immediately clear, that the government's optimal strategy after the firm has stopped investing, at that point in time, is to levy the maximal corporate tax rate, It is easy to show that the rentability of the capital stock p, gíven by equation (5), is minimal for a-1-w with value 1-w and that l~i~m g-m and lim p-1. It is also eesy to ahow that~i s maximal for a satisfying aTl a . ln{(1-a)W} -0, 
